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Managerial Ability, Earnings Quality and ISIS: Evidence from Iraq  
 
Abstract 
Purpose — This study investigates the association between managerial ability and earnings 
quality in firms listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange and how the emergence of the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) influences the association. 
Design/methodology/approach — This study uses a sample of firms listed on the Iraq Stock 
Exchange over the period 2012-2018. Managerial ability is quantified using data envelopment 
analysis, and earnings quality is measured by earnings restatement, earnings persistence, 
accruals quality, and earnings response coefficient. Panel regression analysis is used to 
examine the research hypotheses.  
Findings — The findings indicate that managerial ability positively affects earnings quality of 
Iraqi firms, and that ISIS weakens the relationship between managerial ability and earnings 
quality. These findings are robust to the alternative measures of managerial ability, as well as 
to various approaches used to address endogeneity including propensity-score matching and a 
difference-in-differences analysis. 
Originality/value — This study provides insight into the impact of managerial ability on 
earnings quality in an under-studied emerging market. Furthermore, this study broadens the 
existing literature about the financial consequences of a modern terrorist group, ISIS. 





The managerial heterogeneity literature (e.g., Demerjian et al. 2013; Yung and Chen 2018; 
Baik et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020a; Choo et al., 2020; Doukas and Zhang, 2020; Francis et 
al., 2020; Hesarzadeh, 2020; Luu et al., 2020; Oskouei and Sureshjani, 2020; Yung and 
Nguyen, 2020) indicates that managerial ability — defined as higher power in the 
generation of sales revenue for a given set of resources the firm owns (Demerjian et al., 
2012) — is an important factor that affects tax avoidance, corporate investment, cost of 
debt, corporate innovative success, executive compensation and firm performance.1 
Particularly, in the context of financial reporting, prior studies (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2013; 
2017; Huang and Sun, 2017) show that managerial ability significantly affects earnings 
quality. However, the literature provides mixed evidence on how managerial ability 
influences earnings quality. On the one hand, higher managerial ability reflects more 
managerial knowledge of the business and its operating environment which leads to better 
judgments, estimates and monitoring, and hence, higher earnings quality (e.g., Demerjian et 
al., 2013; Wells, 2020). On the other hand, more able managers may increase their payoffs 
through opaque corporate reporting and poor earnings quality (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2017). 
While in developed markets there is empirical evidence supporting the positive impact of 
managerial ability on earnings quality, there is scarce evidence in the case of emerging 
markets, where their unique complexities can lead to different results.   
One possible reason for the aforementioned discrepancy is outlined in the literature, 
which suggests that the impact of managerial ability on diverse variables may be influenced 
by uncertainty (e.g., Rosen, 1981; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Bamber et al., 2010; Hribar et 
 
1 Following the literature (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2015; Baik et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020a; 
Doukas and Zhang, 2020; Francis et al., 2020; Luu et al., 2020; Oskouei and Sureshjani, 2020; Yung and 
Nguyen, 2020), this paper defines managerial ability based on managerial efficiency, relative to their industry 
peers, in transforming corporate resources to revenues. Assessing managerial ability based on managerial 
efficiency is intuitively appealing as it is in line with the overarching goal of profit-maximizing firms (e.g., 
Demerjian et al., 2012; Doukas and Zhang, 2020). 
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al., 2017; Chen et al., 2020a). Particularly, prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2015; Boone et al., 
2018; Chen, 2019) document that the effect of management varies with the degree of 
uncertainty; the higher (lower) the uncertainty, the more (less) judgment is needed for 
accounting choices, and hence a stronger (weaker) impact of managerial ability is thus 
expected. To empirically investigate how uncertainty influences the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings quality, we focus on the influence of terrorist activities as an 
exogenous force which increases uncertainty (e.g., Czinkota et al., 2010; Chen, 2019).  
This study examines the impact of managerial ability on earnings quality in the context 
of an under-studied emerging market, the Iraq Stock Exchange. The Iraqi market provides a 
unique setting as it has had to operate in an environment along with a modern terrorist group, 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS gained global prominence in late 2014 when it 
drove the Government of Iraq forces out of important cities in its Western Iraqi offensive. 
ISIS has been recognized as a terrorist organization by most countries around the world. 
Traditionally, terrorism was largely viewed as being a phenomenon to be best understood 
through legal and security lenses (Simons, 2018). However, little is known about the 
economic consequences of terroristic activities in general and ISIS activities in particular 
(e.g., Githing’u et al., 2020). This study investigates the impact of ISIS in the context of 
business to see how earnings quality of Iraqi firms is affected. 
Using a sample of 245 firm-years observations from the Iraq Stock Exchange, the findings 
suggest that there is a positive link between managerial ability and earnings quality. Furthermore, 
consistent with theoretical arguments suggesting that the uncertainty caused by ISIS can affect 
managerial estimation and judgment (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2020), this paper finds that the 
presences of ISIS and geographical proximity to ISIS negatively affect the association between 
managerial ability and earnings quality.  
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This study contributes to the empirical literature on the association between managerial 
ability and earnings quality by investigating an under-studied emerging market setting. More 
importantly, it sheds light on how the emergence of ISIS may influence the aforementioned 
association. Thus, this study contributes to positive accounting theory, where the central theme 
is accounting choices by managers, and provides evidence on how terrorism influences 
earnings quality. While terrorism is generally studied through legal and security frameworks 
(Simons, 2018), this study adds to a growing body of literature investigating the impact of 
terrorism on business (e.g., Stergiou, 2016; Lin, 2020; Duru et al., 2020). Due to the increasing 
prevalence of terrorism around the world, understanding the consequences thereof for the 
business community within a society is important (Moser, 2020). The findings of this paper carry 
potential implications for investment practitioners, regulators, and academics. As Chen et al. 
(2020b) point out “the economics of security is one of the most important issues in our discipline, 
yet, the one least researched”. In addition, in response to the recent call to study the firm-level 
consequences of terrorism in different countries (e.g., Chen et al., 2020c), this study provides 
insight into the impact of a modern terrorist group i.e., ISIS.  
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background for the study and 
develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research methods employed. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the main results as well as additional analysis. Finally, section 6 provides 
concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional setting, literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Institutional setting 
2.1.1. Iraq Stock Exchange 
The Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) is located in Baghdad (i.e., the capital of Iraq). It was 
established in 2004 and opened to international investors in 2007. Before the invasion of Iraq 
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in 2003, the country’s stock exchange was the Baghdad Stock Exchange, which was founded 
in 1991 and launched stock trading in 1992 with 64 listed firms. The ISX is considered as a 
self-regulatory organization governed by the Securities Commission of Iraq, the Iraqi version 
of the U.S. SEC. This commission serves as the bridge between the former state-owned stock 
exchange and the new independent stock exchange (e.g., Bradosti and Singh, 2015). The ISX 
operates electronic trading platforms provided by the NASDAQ, and currently lists over 100 
firms with a total market capitalization of USD 10.5 billion as of year 2019.  
The ISX is relatively comparable to most Asian emerging capital markets. For instance, 
at a macro level, similar to most developing countries in the last decade, the Government of 
Iraq has implemented macro stabilization plans and liberalized financial and corporate 
systems, leading to improved market infrastructures to facilitate the flourishing of the ISX 
(Vandenbrink and Wei-Yen, 2015; OECD, 2017). Moreover, the Iraqi government has 
brought foreign debts under control, reduced inflation, and improved some key social and 
economic performance indexes. At a micro level, similar to most emerging capital markets, 
the number of Iraqi firms in the capital market has increased. The listed firms tend to have 
highly concentrated ownership structures.  
As a relatively small and under-studied market, investigating the ISX may also help 
understand other similar frontier markets such as those in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) including Bahrain, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia and even smaller markets such 
as those of Armenia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Laos, Libya, Maldives, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Syria, and Tanzania (see FOX News, 2020, for details 
about the smallest capital markets around the world). However, although many Middle 
Eastern markets have been affected by the terrorist activities of ISIS, they have had the most 
negative impact on the ISX. Thus, the ISX can provide a unique setting for studying the 
impact of terrorism.  
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2.1.2. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
Terrorism and terroristic groups continue to be a problem for businesses around the world. 
Today, of the 162 countries tracked by the Institute for Economics and Peace, only 37 countries 
are free from incidents of terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). Among the 
terroristic groups, ISIS gained global prominence when it defeated and drove the Government 
of Iraq forces out of important Iraqi cities such as Mosul in 2015 (Carter et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, the origins of ISIS may be traced back to 1999, when it was known as Jama'at 
al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Then, it pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and was involved in joint 
operations with Al-Qaeda in Iraq after the US-led invasion of the country in 2003 (Zelin, 2014). 
ISIS grew under the Salafi/Wahhabi school of thought and prioritized its strategy towards 
destabilizing and replacing the governing status quo in Iraq and Syria. Having captured large 
swaths of territories in Iraq and Syria, ISIS expanded its goals to include the pursuit of a global 
caliphate; seeking the literal expansion of the caliphate and establishing a global radicalization 
effort that can be self-sustaining over generations (McFate, 2015). At the same time, the group 
built its strategy around uncompromising use of violence and a harsh ideology aimed at the 
creation of a long-term caliphate–one for the regional power centers, one for the Muslim world, 
and one for the non-Muslim world (Githing’u et al., 2020). 
A moral panic has been created by the appeal of ISIS in face of the assumed superior 
values of neoliberal globalization and multiculturalism (Wood, 2015). This appeal is seemingly 
rather diverse, with recruits and supporters being drawn in from across the world. This has led 
to the organization being deemed as a global threat (Carafano, 2016). Utilizing remote sensing 
data and commercial satellite imagery, Robinson et al. (2019) provide a unique perspective on 
the internal situation in ISIS-controlled areas. It gives a clear picture of life in these areas which 
is characterized by electricity shortages, a large number of displaced people, reduced 
agricultural products, and increasing violence. While ISIS in Raqqa and Mosul, as its strategic 
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capitals, helped stabilize local business by building some government structures, in other ISIS-
controlled areas, the group has either neglected vital resources or replaced the government. 
Furthermore, the main reason for the economic collapse of ISIS was its inefficiency in 
separating its territory from the areas controlled by other armed opposition groups. In addition, 
external military pressure on ISIS also prevented the group from realizing its governmental 
ambitions across key parts of the so-called caliphate. This had major implications for the 
group's ability to support the performance of the local economy. Johnston (2014) and Stergiou 
(2016) note that ISIS spent its financial resources pursuing the following objectives: expanding 
its territorial bases in Iraq and Syria, expanding its influence across other strategic parts of 
MENA, and funding plots for attacks in North America, Western Europe or elsewhere.  
2.2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that managers, being homogeneous and rational 
optimizers, have a limited individual influence on corporate outcomes (e.g., Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003). However, analytical studies (e.g., Rosen, 1981; Gabaix and Landier, 2008), 
consistent with human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1964) and upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), support the notion that managers can play a significant role in 
shaping corporate outcomes. A growing body of empirical studies examine the impact of 
managerial ability on corporate decisions and outcomes, such as investment efficiency (e.g., 
Habib and Hasan, 2017), credit rating (Cornaggia et al., 2017), tax avoidance (e., Park et al., 
2015), executive compensation (Gan and Park, 2016), and firm performance (e.g., Chang et 
al. 2010). Accounting and financial scholars endeavor to explain why and how managers 
affect accounting choices. Particularly, positive accounting theory (PAT) attempts to explain 
and predict the accounting choices made by managers under different circumstances (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990). Consistent with PAT, managers may choose accounting practices for 
their own best interests and to maximize their utility (Scott, 2009), which is in line with 
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agency theory. To clarify, accounting standards or requirements, for the sake of reporting 
efficiency, allow some flexibility to choose from a set of available accounting practices. This 
flexibility opens up the possibility of opportunistic behavior. Thus, in the process of 
analyzing costs and benefits of accounting decisions, managers may choose accounting 
practices for their own best interests and to maximize their utility (Silva et al., 2019).  
Generally, in the context of managerial ability and corporate reporting, prior research 
argues that equity-based compensation incentivizes high-ability managers to improve 
corporate reporting quality (Milbourn, 2003). Trueman (1986) theorizes that because the 
market values information about firms’ underlying economics, high-ability managers receiving 
equity-based compensation have incentives to inform the market about such information. 
Relatedly, Baik et al. (2011) report that managerial ability is positively related to the likelihood, 
accuracy, and value relevance of voluntary management earnings forecasts. In contrast, high-
ability managers may increase their payoffs through opaque disclosures. Previous studies also 
argue that entrenched managers could extract a higher informational rent through the use 
opaque financial reporting (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kalyta and Magnan, 2008).  
Particularly, it is expected that managers significantly influence accounting choices and 
hence earnings quality. In this respect, the literature (e.g., DeJong and Ling, 2013; Francis et 
al., 2020) indicates that managerial ability can play a key role in changing accounting 
choices, since managers can influence the implementation of accounting standards and the 
preparation of financial statements. Furthermore, career concerns and the external reputation 
of managers are shown to be key drivers of accounting choices (e.g., Graham et al., 2005).   
There are plausible competing arguments over the direction of the association between 
managerial ability and earnings quality. The first perspective is that having a competent 
manager leads to a better understanding of business and industry resulting in better accounting 
choices, more reliable estimates, and also more accurate judgments about accruals (e.g., Baik 
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et al., 2020). For instance, regarding the estimation of the provision for bad debt, less able 
managers may use the historical rate of bad debt, while more able managers may adjust the 
historical rate using factors such as macro-economic and industry trends, and changes in the 
entity’s customer base (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2013). Thus, more able managers are expected 
to report higher quality earnings as they can better estimate earnings in complex situations. 
Furthermore, more able managers better understand the internal and external context of the 
company which leads to more accurate accruals. They can also more accurately identify 
profitable projects through their knowledge and experience, and by investing in them, they can 
improve operational cash flows (e.g., Demirjian et al., 2013), which in turn enhances earnings 
quality (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Consistently, Wells (2020) shows that individual 
managers’ fixed effects can explain a significant proportion of cross-sectional variation in 
earnings quality and Francis et al. (2020) demonstrate that better management leads to higher 
value relevance of earnings.  
The second perspective is that more able managers raise their payoffs through opaque 
disclosures. Entrenched managers may extract higher information rent by way of providing 
opaque corporate reporting (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kalyta and Magnan, 2008). There 
is also evidence that poor managers at the top provide inadequate monitoring resulting in a 
weak information environment (e.g., Klein, 2002) even though it may not be in the manager’s 
best interests. Therefore, managers may play a negative role in the financial reporting process 
and exert significant influence on earnings through their operating decisions (Choi et al., 2015).  
While in developed markets empirical evidence is consistent with a positive impact of 
managerial ability on earnings quality, there is scarce evidence in the context of emerging 
markets, particularly small markets, and the direction of the association between managerial 
ability and earnings quality is an empirical quandary. This is at least partly due to the high 
level of uncertainty in emerging markets (Bu et al., 2020), which can affect the relationship 
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between managerial ability and earnings quality. El Ghoul et al. (2020) suggest that 
economic policy uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about future government actions) may 
influence financial reporting choices through its impact on investors’ attention to firm-
specific information. This is because uncertainty may lead market participants to evaluate 
firms’ disclosure quality more (less) closely, resulting in more (less) monitoring constraints 
on corporate actions and choices. Chen et al. (2020a) also argue that the effect of managerial 
ability is stronger in environments with higher macro uncertainty (such as economic policy 
uncertainty), as more able managers can more effectively manage the complexities of the 
business environment. Moreover, Bamber et al. (2010) argue that managers are not 
effectively interchangeable, and idiosyncratic differences in quality of management can lead 
them to make different choices, particularly in complex situations. This point is very relevant 
to emerging markets due to their higher complexities, information asymmetries, and a lack of 
transparency. As Nichols et al. (2009) point out, managers in emerging markets face higher 
levels of complexity arising from diverse types of risks such as exchange rate risk or liquidity 
risk. Bamber et al. (2010) suggest that in complex situations, managers’ rational choices can 
be affected by managerial idiosyncratic experiences and values. Thus, in order not to lose 
stockholders’ confidence in emerging markets and to avoid reputational damages (e.g., Singh 
and Misra, 2021), more able managers may have strong incentives to avoid negative earnings, 
which can affect their financial reporting choices and thereby earnings quality.  
Based on the above discussions, it is expected that managerial ability significantly affects 
earnings quality of Iraqi firms. Since there are conflicting arguments and mixed empirical 
evidence, the first hypothesis is non-directional:  
H1: Managerial ability significantly affects earnings quality of Iraqi firms. 
This paper also examines whether and how ISIS influences the association between 
managerial ability and earnings quality. Theoretically, prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2015; 
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Boone et al., 2018; Chen, 2019) suggest that terrorist attacks cause uncertainty, and in turn 
affect accounting choices and hence the association between managerial ability and earnings 
quality. There are two competing views about how ISIS may affect accounting choices by 
managers and earnings quality. First, consistent with the opportunistic perspective of PAT, 
higher uncertainty caused by ISIS provides an opportunity for managers not to prepare high 
quality information resulting in lower earnings quality. Kim et al. (2015) show that under the 
high levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, the likelihood of management forecast issuance is 
low. Moreover, Boone et al. (2018) demonstrate that managers decrease corporate 
information disclosure if they perceive a relatively high disclosure risk due to current 
uncertainty. Particularly, Duru et al. (2020) note that macroeconomic uncertainty driven by 
terrorist activities can negatively affect managers’ perceptions of firm future performance and 
result in poor judgments and estimations which can affect accounting accruals. Moreover, 
managers in firms that suffer losses from actual incidents of terrorism have strong incentives 
to hide poor firm performance or financial distress through lower earnings quality (Moser, 
2020). Moreover, they may further drive down earnings quality in an effort to obfuscate poor 
performance in order to avoid unstable operating conditions, declines in stock prices, and 
debt covenant violations, which can negatively affect managers’ reputations and 
compensation as well as managerial turnover (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Cui et al., 
2020). Relatedly, Iatridis (2012) and also Rachmawati and Adhariani (2019) indicate that 
managers may use discretionary accounting policies in order to mitigate the negative impact 
of a terrorist attack and maintain their current financial condition. Furthermore, under 
macroeconomic uncertainty caused by terrorism, managers can more easily influence 
accruals opportunistically and shift earnings from uncertain to more certain times (e.g., Stein 
and Wang, 2016). Ongsakul et al. (2020) also provide evidence highlighting that when 
terrorist attacks occur, managers have strong incentives to manipulate accruals as the market 
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reaction to the attacks is substantially mitigated for firms with higher discretionary accruals. 
Cui et al. (2020) suggest that the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on opportunistic 
managerial choices is more pronounced when monitoring mechanisms are weak. This is 
particularly relevant to small and emerging markets like the ISX, where monitoring and 
investor protection mechanisms are not strong. 
Second, in line with the efficient perspective of PAT, high uncertainty caused by ISIS 
may lead to efficient accounting choices, resulting in high earnings quality. In line with this 
intuition, there is evidence that macroeconomic uncertainty may positively influence 
accounting choices as the uncertainty can lead market participants to evaluate firms’ 
disclosure quality more closely, resulting in more monitoring constraints on accounting 
choices by managers, and hence less opportunistic behavior (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2020). Cui 
et al. (2020) discuss that to reduce the negative impact of macroeconomic uncertainty, such 
as higher capital costs, managers are strongly motivated to provide high quality information 
(Verrecchia, 1990; Baker et al., 2016). Particularly, in the context of high macroeconomic 
uncertainty from terrorist activities, managers can easily attribute their poor performance to 
terrorist attacks (e.g., Chen et al., 2020b), therefore, they do not necessarily need to 
opportunistically influence accruals accounting. In addition, Schmid (2005) states that 
terrorist activities may cause managers to experience the psychological consequences of fear 
and pessimism making them more risk averse. This is particularly relevant to ISIS as it 
strategically and systematically seeks to create profound fear (Simons, 2018). Such tendency 
toward risk aversion may induce safer accounting choices by managers (Moser, 2020). For 
example, Cuculiza et al. (2020) document that managers who have experienced terrorist 
attacks are less likely to choose aggressive corporate policies, which improve accruals and 
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2013; Zhong and Li, 2017). Similarly, 
Chen (2019) argues that managers affected by terrorist attacks are less likely to overestimate 
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accruals. Lin (2020) further indicates that managers with higher risk aversion may prepare 
their financial reports more carefully.  
Based on these two perspectives (i.e., opportunistic perspective versus efficient 
perspective), ISIS might negatively or positively affect accounting choices by managers, and 
thus, it can moderate the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality. This 
leads to the second hypothesis which is also non-directional: 
H2: The presence of ISIS moderates the relationship between managerial ability and earnings 
quality. 
Prior studies (e.g., Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005; Defond et al., 2018) reveal the 
importance of geographical location in diverse contexts. For example, Defond et al. (2018) 
find that proximity to SEC offices make external auditors more aware of SEC scrutiny with 
regard misconduct. Particularly, in the context of terrorism, Cuculiza et al. (2020) document 
that analysts located close to terrorist attacks provide more pessimistic earnings forecasts. 
Further, Dai et al. (2020) note that managers of firms located close to terrorist attacks prefer 
cash-based compensation over more volatile equity-based compensation, suggesting that 
managers exposed to local attacks are more risk averse. In addition, there is evidence that the 
impact of terrorist attacks on residents’ emotions decreases with the distance from terrorist 
attacks (Galea et al., 2002). Lin (2020) studies the impact of terrorist attacks on audit 
practices suggesting that terrorist attacks that occur within 10 miles of the auditors’ office 
have the strongest impact. Relatedly, Chen et al. (2020b) reveal that the geographical distance 
between a firm and the location of terrorist attacks influences earnings disclosures.  
Thus, consistent with arguments regarding the second hypothesis — including the 
opportunistic perspective versus the efficient perspective on ISIS impacts — it is expected 
that closeness to ISIS-controlled territories influences the association of managerial ability 
and earnings quality. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H3: Geographical proximity to ISIS moderates the relationship between managerial ability and 
earnings quality. 
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework for hypotheses development.  
(Please insert Figure 1 around here) 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and data 
This paper studies firms listed on the ISX including 84 active firms. Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Reeb and Zhao, 2013; Doukas and Zhang, 2020; Kontesa et al., 2020; Oskouei 
and Sureshjani, 2020), financial industries (38 firms) are excluded because they are different 
in nature. Firms with unavailable information (11 firms) are also deleted. The final sample 
includes 245 firm-years observations representing 35 unique firms for the period 2012 to 
2018. The period 2012-2014 is considered as the pre-ISIS period, and 2015-2018 as the post-
ISIS period.  
3.2. Variable definitions 
Managerial ability 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2015; Baik et al., 2020; 
Chen et al., 2020a; Doukas and Zhang, 2020; Francis et al., 2020; Luu et al., 2020; Oskouei 
and Sureshjani, 2020; Yung and Nguyen, 2020), our measure of managerial ability is 
determined using the model by Demerjian et al. (2012), which is also employed by research on 
Asian emerging and small capital markets such as Iran (Hesarzadeh, 2020), Pakistan (Inam 
Bhutta, 2021), Korea (Cho et al., 2018), and Taiwan (Choo et al., 2020). This model is based 
on data development analysis (DEA), which takes a non-linear optimization approach, enabling 
us to measure managerial ability based on the output generated by the firm from diverse input, 
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and to benchmark the output against what could theoretically be generated (Baghdadi et al., 
2018; Baik et al., 2020; Yung and Nguyen, 2020).  
We estimate managerial ability through a two-step procedure. First, firm efficiency is 
operationalized through an optimization algorithm in which sales is the output and tangible 
and intangible assets, cost of inventory, R&D, operating leases, and general & administrative 
expenses are the input. The optimization algorithm can be run in two equivalent forms: 
output-oriented or input-oriented. This paper follows the prior literature and employs the 
input-oriented form (e.g., Baik et al., 2011; Demerjian et al., 2013). However, the outcomes 
these algorithms yield are identical (Cooper et al., 2006, p.105; Demerjian et al., 2013). 
Therefore, since firm efficiency reflects both managerial ability and also firm characteristics, 
we decompose the two by regressing firm efficiency on firm characteristics, including size, 
age, concentration of business segments, availability of cash, foreign transactions, and market 
share. The residual denotes the managerial ability score (M.Ability). Since DEA can be 
sensitive to outliers, following previous studies (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2013; Hesarzadeh, 
2020; Yung and Nguyen, 2020), all output and input variables are winsorized at 1% tails.  
Earnings quality 
Earnings quality is measured by four widely used proxies (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010; Demerjian 
et al. 2012; 2017; Wells, 2020): 
− Restate: A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm restates its earnings, and zero 
otherwise. 
− Persist: Earnings persistence is calculated using the following model:  
Earningsjt+1 = α + β1 Earningsjt + Ɛjt 
Where Earnings is net profit, and β1 denotes earnings persistence. 





















Where WCA denotes working capital accruals, CFO is cash flow from operations, 
ΔREV is change in sales, and PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. The 
residuals from the equation above is our measure of accruals quality: the lower the 
value, the higher accruals quality. The values are multiplied by minus one to ensure 
that we interpret higher values as higher accruals quality.  
− ERC: Following Dechow et al. (2010), the following equation is used to measure 
earnings response coefficient:  
Returnt+1,i = a0 + a1 Earnings t,i + єt,i 
Where Return is the annual stock returns and a1 indicates earnings response 
coefficient.  
ISIS and proximity to ISIS 
In the second and third hypotheses, there are two moderator variables i.e., the presence of ISIS 
and the geographical proximity to ISIS. ISIS is a dummy variable set equal to one for 
observations belonging to the post-ISIS period (i.e., 2015-2018), and zero otherwise. To 
operationalize the geographical proximity to ISIS, we use the median of distance from ISIS 
territories. ISISproximity is a dummy variable set equal to one if the distance of firms headquarters 
from ISIS-controlled territories is above the median, and zero otherwise.  It should be noted 
that ISISproximity is calculated only for the post-ISIS period.  
Control variables 
Following prior studies (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010; Beck et al., 2012; Demerjian et al. 2012; 
2017; Robinson et al. 2019; Wells, 2020), the following control variables are used.  




− Sales Volatility measured as the standard deviation of the ratio of sales to total assets 
over the past three years. 
− Cash Flow Volatility measured as the standard deviation of operational cash flow to 
total assets over the past three years. 
− Operating Cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the ratio of receivables to 
sales and the ratio of inventories to the cost of goods sold.  
− Big Auditor is a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm is audited by the Supreme 
Audit of Iraq, and zero otherwise. 
− Loss is a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm reports a loss in the current year, 
and zero otherwise. 
− Sales Growth measured as the percentage of change in sales. 
− Return on Assets measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
3.3. Empirical models 
The first hypothesis (H1) predicts that managerial ability significantly affects earnings quality. 
We use four proxies for measuring earnings quality, including earnings restatement, earnings 
persistence, accruals quality, and earnings response coefficient. Hence, to test H1, we run the 
following four models (panel regressions):   
Restatet+1,i    = a0 + a1M.Ability t,i + Controls + fixed effects + єt,i   (1) 
Earnings t+1,i= a0 + a1Earnings t,i + a2M.Ability t,i + a3Earnings× M.Ability t,i + Controls 
+ fixed effects + єt,i      (2) 
AQ t+1,i             = a0 + a1M.Ability t,i + Controls + fixed effects + єt,i   (3) 
Return t+1,i          = a0 + a1Earnings t,i + a2M.Ability t,i + a3Earnings×M.Ability t,i + 
Controls + fixed effects + єt,i      (4) 
In all equations, Controls reflects control variables and fixed effects implies year and firm fixed 
effects. All variables are as previously defined.  
To test the second hypothesis (H2), i.e., the impact of ISIS on the association of 
managerial ability and earnings quality metrics, based on Equations (1) to (4), the present study 
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uses the following four models, respectively. In Equations (5) & (7), a3 shows how ISIS 
influences the association of managerial ability and earnings restatement & accruals quality. 
Further, in Equations (6) & (8), a5 displays how ISIS affects the association of managerial 
ability and earnings persistence & earnings response coefficient (see for example, Burks et al. 
(2019) for details about interpreting regressions with interactions). 
Restatet+1,i   = a0 + a1M.Ability t,i + a2ISIS t,i + a3M.Ability×ISIS t,i + Controls + fixed 
effects + єt,i        (5) 
Earnings t+1,i= a0 + a1Earnings t,i + a2M.Ability t,i + a3Earnings×M.Ability t,i + a4ISISt,i  + 
a5ISIS× Earnings×M.Ability t,i + Controls + fixed effects + єt,i  (6) 
AQ t+1,i         = a0 + a1M.Ability t,i + a2ISIS t,i + a3ISIS×M.Ability t,i + Controls + fixed 
effects + єt,i        (7) 
Returnt+1,i     = a0 + a1Earnings t,i + a2M.Ability t,i + a3Earnings×M.Ability t,i + a4ISIS t,i 
+ a5ISIS× Earnings ×M.Ability t,i + Controls + fixed effects + єt,i  (8) 
Finally, to test the third hypothesis (H3), i.e., the impact of the geographical proximity 
to ISIS on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality, we replace the 
variables ISIS in equations (5) to (8) with ISISproximity and re-run the models.  
4. Findings 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 present descriptive statistics for the main variables. To minimize the impact of extreme 
values, all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level. As the table shows, on average, 
36% of companies have restated their earnings, and the mean of earnings persistence, accruals 
quality, and earnings response coefficient are 0.152, -0.069, and 0.014, respectively. 
Descriptive statistics suggest that earnings quality of Iraqi firms is poorer than its counterparts 
in large capital markets; for example, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) report that it is 0.030 in US 
firms. It is also lower than in other emerging markets (see, for example, Hesarzadeh (2020) 
who shows that the mean of AQ is -0.054 for Iranian firms). The mean of managerial ability is 
-0.001, which is close to prior studies; for instance, Doukas and Zhang (2020) and Francis et al. 
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(2020) report 0.012 and -0.006, respectively. However, the standard deviation of managerial 
ability is approximately 0.363, which is higher than that reported by prior studies. The mean 
of the ISIS dummy indicates that about 57% of firm-years observations belong to the ISIS 
periods.  
(Please insert Table 1 around here) 
 
4.2. Inferential statistics 
4.2.1. Managerial ability and earnings quality 
The first hypothesis predicts that managerial ability significantly affects earnings quality. To 
test this, using Equations (1) to (4) in section 3.3, the four measures of earnings quality are 
regressed on managerial ability. Table 2 reports the results. Following prior studies (e.g., 
Petersen 2009; Fernández Méndez et al. 2016), in all equations, standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation by clustering at the firm level. As shown 
in the table, the coefficient on managerial ability (M.Ability) is negative (-0.172) in Equation 
(1) and positive (0.189) in Equation (3) and both coefficients are statistically significant at 5% 
level. These suggest that higher managerial ability leads to lower earnings restatement and 
higher accruals quality. Furthermore, the coefficient on Earnings×M.Ability is positive and 
significant in Equations (2) and (4). This indicates that management ability has a significant 
effect on both earnings persistence and earnings response coefficient as the coefficients on 
Persist and ERC are 0.038 and 0.027, respectively, and that both increase with managerial 
ability. Particularly, earnings persistence increases from 0.038 to 0.059 (0.038 + 0.021) when 
moving from the lowest to the highest managerial ability. Similarly, earnings response 
coefficient increases from 0.027 to 0.041 (0.027 + 0.014) when moving from the lowest to the 
highest managerial ability. These findings show that higher managerial ability leads to higher 
earnings persistence and earnings response coefficient, which is consistent with the first 
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hypothesis. Overall, the results are consistent with human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1964) 
and upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and support the notion that managers 
could play a significant role in shaping corporate outcomes. 
 (Please insert Table 2 around here) 
4.2.2. The Impact of ISIS 
The second hypothesis predicts that the presence of ISIS has a negative impact on the 
relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality. To test this, Equations (5) to (8) 
are run and the results are reported in Table 3. The table shows that the coefficients on 
ISIS×M.Ability are significant at 5% in Equations (5) and (7) which suggests that ISIS 
moderates the association of managerial ability with earnings restatement and accruals quality. 
In Equation (5), the conditional coefficient on managerial ability (M.Ability) — the effect of 
managerial ability on earnings quality, when ISIS equals zero — is -0.183 which changes with 
ISIS; hence, the association between managerial ability and earnings restatement increases 
from -0.183 to -0.091 (-0.183 + 0.092) when moving from pre- to post-ISIS periods. This 
suggests that ISIS weakens the impact of managerial ability on earnings restatement. Similarly, 
in Equation (7), the coefficient on managerial ability decreases from 0.285 to 0.140 (0.285 − 
0.145) when moving from pre- to post-ISIS, suggesting that ISIS weakens the impact of 
managerial ability on accruals quality.   
The results reported for Equations (6) and (8) show that the coefficients on the 
Earnings×M.Ability×ISIS are statistically significant suggesting that ISIS moderates the 
association of managerial ability with earnings persistence and earnings response coefficient. 
For further clarification, in Equation (6), the conditional coefficient on the interaction between 
earnings and managerial ability (Earnings×M.Ability) — i.e., the conditional association 
between earnings persistence and managerial ability — is 0.093, which changes with ISIS. 
Specifically, the conditional association of earnings persistence and managerial ability 
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decreases from 0.093 to 0.041 (0.093 - 0.052) when moving from pre- to post-ISIS. This 
suggests that ISIS reduces the impact of managerial ability on earnings persistence. Similarly, 
in Equation (8), the conditional coefficient on the interaction of earnings and managerial ability 
(Earnings×M.Ability) — i.e., the conditional association between earnings response coefficient 
and managerial ability — is 0.075 which decreases to 0.024 (0.075 - 0.051) when moving from 
pre- to post-ISIS. This suggests that ISIS weakens the impact of managerial ability on earnings 
response. The coefficient on ISIS in all four equations shows that ISIS negatively affects 
earnings and returns (see Equations (6) and (8)) and also leads to higher earnings restatement 
and lower accruals quality (see Equations (5) and (7)).  
Overall, the results demonstrate that the presence of ISIS has a significantly negative 
impact on the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality, which is in line 
with the opportunistic perspective of PAT.  
(Please insert Table 3 around here) 
To examine the effect size of terrorism, following Dawson (2014), this paper plots the 
effect and computes f 2 which is the ratio of variance explained by the interaction term alone to 
the unexplained variance in Equations 5 to 8. Figure 2 displays the plots and f 2. Consistent 
with previous findings, the figure visually shows that ISIS has a significantly negative impact 
on the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality. For instance, as shown in 
the figure, the magnitude of the slope for the negative association between restatement and 
managerial ability is smaller in the ISIS period. Furthermore, the slope for the positive 
association between earnings persistence and managerial ability is smaller in the ISIS period. 
More importantly, f 2s are higher than 10% which denotes that the strength of the moderating 
effect is economically significant.2  
 




4.2.3. The Impact of Proximity to ISIS Territories 
The third hypothesis predicts that the geographical proximity to ISIS has a significantly 
negative impact on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality. To 
empirically examine this, Equations (5) to (8) are run and the results are reported in Table 4. 
The table shows that the coefficients on M.Ability× ISISproximity are significant at 5% in Equations 
(5) and (7) which suggests that the geographical proximity to ISIS moderates the association 
of managerial ability with earnings restatement and accruals quality. In Equation (5), the 
coefficient on M.Ability is -0.267 which increases to -0.116 (-0.267 + 0.151) when moving from 
the firms far from ISIS-controlled territory (ISISproximity = 0) to the firms closer to ISIS 
(ISISproximity = 1). This suggests that the geographical proximity to ISIS weakens the impact of 
managerial ability on earnings restatement. Similarly, in Equation (7), the association between 
managerial ability and accruals quality decreases from 0.506 to 0.158 (0.506 − 0.348) when 
moving closer to ISIS, indicating that the geographical proximity to ISIS weakens the impact 
of managerial ability on accruals quality.   
The results reported for Equations (6) and (8) show that the coefficients on 
Earnings×M.Ability×ISISproximity are statistically significant suggesting that the geographical 
proximity to ISIS moderates the association of managerial ability with earnings persistence and 
earnings response coefficient. In Equation (6), the coefficient on Earnings×M.Ability, i.e., the 
association between earnings persistence and managerial ability, is 0.079 which decreases to 
0.007 (0.079 - 0.072) when moving closer to ISIS territories. This indicates that the 
geographical proximity to ISIS weakens the impact of managerial ability on earnings response. 
Similarly, in Equation (8), the coefficient on Earnings×M.Ability, i.e., the association between 
earnings response coefficient and managerial ability, is 0.561 which decreases to 0.167 (0.556 
- 0.389) when moving closer to ISIS-controlled territories. This suggests that the geographical 
proximity to ISIS weakens the impact of managerial ability on earnings response.  
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 Untabulated f 2s for the moderating effects of the geographical proximity to ISIS are 
higher than 13% suggesting that the effects are economically significant.   
Thus, taken together, the results reveal that the geographical proximity to ISIS has a 
negative impact on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality, which is 
consistent with the initial findings for the second hypothesis, i.e., the opportunistic perspective 
of PAT. 
(Please insert Table 4 around here) 
 
5. Additional analysis 
5.1. Alternative measures of managerial ability 
This section examines the robustness of results to the alternative measures of managerial 
ability used by prior studies (e.g., Reeb and Zhao, 2013; Hsieh et al., 2018, Lai et al., 2019; 
Kontesa et al., 2020). We use four measures of managerial ability including directors’ 
networking or social capital (the number of corporate boards a director sits on during the 
year), educational capital (the number of directors with a graduated degree), expertise (the 
number of directors with expertise in five areas including law, investment bank, management 
consulting, and accounting), and working experience (the number of positions higher than 
vice president that directors have held during their lifetime). In this regard, first, borrowing 
insights from the literature, this study develops a composite measure of the alternative 
measures, M.Abilitycomp, which is the principal component analysis of the aforementioned 
four measures. Then, the research hypotheses are re-examined using the new measures.  
Table 5 reports the results for alternative measures of managerial ability. As the table 
shows, the number of observations has decreased significantly as a consequence of data 
unavailability. Nonetheless, the results suggest that the main findings are not sensitive to the 
use of alternative measures of managerial ability.  
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(Please insert Table 5 around here) 
5.2. Addressing Potential Endogeneities 
ISIS may have simultaneously affected both managerial ability and earnings quality, which 
raises endogeneity concerns. To address this, following past research (e.g., Shipman et al., 
2017), the propensity-score matching approach is employed. We first regress the dummy 
version of the managerial ability variable (M.Abilitydummy) on ISIS and control variables 
(including market to book value, leverage, cash flow from operations, return on assets, annual 
management bonus, percentage of institutional ownership, and board independence (e.g., 
Demerjian et al., 2012; El Mahdy, 2019; Hesarzadeh, 2020). Then, obtaining the fitted 
(predicted) values from the aforementioned regression, each firm-year observation is matched 
to a firm-year observation with the closest fitted value in the same year and industry. Finally, 
the association between managerial ability and earnings quality is estimated using the 
matched sample. 
The results are reported in Table 6. Panel A of the table shows that ISIS negatively affects 
managerial ability and Panel B indicates that M.Ability remains statistically significant for all 
four measures of earnings quality.  
(Please insert Table 6 around here) 
In addition to matching, we also use the difference-in-differences method to address 
endogeneity (e.g., Aier et al., 2014; Duru et al., 2020). To this end, we examine changes in 
earnings quality of firms exposed to ISIS (treatment group) relative to changes in the earnings 
quality of firms unexposed to it (control group). Using the median of geographical proximity, 
firms in the proximity of ISIS-controlled territories are considered as the treatment group and 
a matched sample of non-local firms within the same industry with a relatively similar size 
(i.e., maximum 10% difference( is considered as the control group, and the following models 
(which are based on Equations (5) to (8), are run: 
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Restatet+1,i    = a0 + a1M.Ability t,i + a2ISISt,i + a3Local + a4ISISt,i×Local×M.Abilityt,i + 
Controls+ єt,i        (9) 
Earnings t+1,i = a0 + a1 Earnings t,i + a2Earnings×M.Abilityt,i + a3ISISt,i + a4Local  
+ a5 ISIS×Local×Earnings×M.Ability t,i + Controls+ єt,i   (10) 
AQ t+1,i         = a0 + a1M.Ability t,i + a2ISISt,i + a3Local + a4 ISIS×Local×M.Abilityt,i + 
Controls+ єt,i                         (11) 
Returnt+1,i    =  a0 + a1Earnings t,i + a2Earnings×M.Ability t,i + a3ISIS t,i + a4Local  
+ a5ISIS×Local×Earnings×M.Ability t,i + Controls+ єt,i   (12) 
 
Where LOCAL is an indicator variable set equal to one for the firms close to ISIS-
controlled territories, and zero otherwise. It should be noted that LOCAL is different from 
ISISproximity as it is not limited to the years after the emergence of ISIS, but it is limited to the 
matched observations. In regressions (9) & (11), the coefficient a4 on ISIS× Local×M.Ability 
captures the difference-in-difference impact of ISIS on the association of managerial ability 
with restatement/accruals quality. Similarly, in regressions (10) & (12), the coefficient a5 on 
ISIS×Local×Earnings×M.Ability captures the difference-in-difference impact of ISIS on the 
association of managerial ability with earnings persistence and earnings response coefficient. 
All other variables are as previously defined.  
Table 7 reports the results. The coefficients on both interaction variables (i.e., 
ISIS×Local×M.Ability and ISIS×Local×Earnings×M.Ability) are statistically significant 
which suggests that similar to the main results, ISIS affects the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings quality.3  
(Please insert Table 7 around here) 
 
3 Notably, while using instrumental variable (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches are 
applicable for addressing potential endogeneities, prior studies show that the approaches are likely to produce 
estimates with less estimation error than propensity-score matching and difference-indifferences methods only 
under the most ideal circumstances. For example, it is hard to find variables that meet the definition of valid 
instruments (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007; Baser, 2009). Conceptually, most variables that have an effect on 
treatment variables may also have a direct effect on the outcomes variable in accounting research (e.g., Gippel et 
al., 2015), especially in this paper, where there are diverse dependent variables. Moreover, in small sample 
sizes, the IV and GMM approaches can be highly inaccurate (e.g., Grootendorst, 2007; Bascle, 2008). 
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5.3. How macroeconomic variables affect research results 
As previously explained, this paper theoretically argues that macroeconomic uncertainty driven 
by terrorist activities can affect managers’ judgments and estimations which can thus affect 
accounting choices. In this line, this section examines the robustness of results to the inclusion 
of macroeconomic variables in empirical models. Thus, following the literature (e.g., Chappell 
et al., 1993; Kim et al., 2015; Bianchi et al., 2019), the current paper employs four key 
macroeconomic variables including gross domestic product growth (GDP), inflation rate 
(Inflation), exchange rate (Exchange), and unemployment rate (Unemployment). Thereafter, 
the research hypotheses are re-examined using these new control variables.  
Table 8 reports the results. Specifically, Panel A (B) presents the results on the 
moderating role of ISIS (proximity to ISIS) after the inclusion of macroeconomic variables in 
empirical analyses. The results suggest that while generally the macroeconomic variables 
may significantly influence dependent variables, the impact of ISIS and also the proximity to 
ISIS on the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality is still significant. 
Therefore, the main findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of macroeconomic variables in 
the empirical analysis.  
(Please insert Table 8 around here) 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on earnings quality of listed Iraqi firms 
and how ISIS affects the association between managerial ability and earnings quality. The 
results indicate that managerial ability leads to lower earnings restatements, higher earnings 
persistent, higher accruals quality, and stronger earnings response coefficient. These findings 
are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2017; Hesarzadeh, 2020) suggesting 
that managerial ability affects corporate reporting. Furthermore, the results indicate that the 
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presence of ISIS and geographical proximity to ISIS weakens the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings quality. These results are also consistent with recent evidence 
(e.g., Duru et al., 2020, Lin, 2020) that negative emotions caused by terrorism can affect 
corporate reporting choices. These results are robust to alternative measures of managerial 
ability and to various approaches used to address endogeneity.  
This study contributes to the broad literature on managerial attributes and corporate policies 
(e.g., García-Meca and García-Sánchez, 2018; Doukas and Zhang, 2020), as it extends our 
understanding of the association between managerial ability and earnings quality in an under-
studied emerging market. More importantly, it extends the recent empirical evidence on the impact 
of terrorism on capital markets at the firm level (e.g., Chen et al., 2020a; Duru et al, 2020; Hills et 
al., 2020). The findings of this study may also enhance our understanding of the economic and 
social consequences of other kinds of terrorist activities. In addition, this paper adds to the literature 
on the impact of geographical location on corporate behavior (e.g., Dai et al., 2020) as it indicates 
that the geographical proximity to ISIS has a negative effect on the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings quality.  
This study has some limitations. First, the research sample is limited to a small, emerging 
capital market, thus the results may not be generalizable to large capital markets. Second, the 
sample is limited to a relatively short time period. While this is consistent with the nature of our 
event study, we encourage readers to exercise caution about the long-term effects of terroristic 
activities . Third, four measures of earnings quality are tested in this study so the results may not 
be generalizable to other measures. Fourth, although Demerjian’s measure of managerial ability 
used in this study is one of the most widely employed in the literature (e.g., Luu et al., 2020), it is 
an approximate measure for managerial performance, hence the possibility that the measure may 
include idiosyncratic abnormal performance cannot be ruled out. Moreover, this measure does 
not include human capital ability which is conceptualized by prior literature (e.g., Hambrick and 
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Mason, 1984). In addition, the measure is about how effective managers use input resources to 
generate output, therefore, if the input/output is different, or if a firm is added or eliminated the 
ability score will be different. Nevertheless, since the main findings are robust to alternative 
measures of managerial ability, the limitations of Demerjian’s measure does not affect our main 
results.  
Generally, the evidence from the current paper may help standard setters and policy 
makers in small emerging markets to better understand corporate reporting behavior in terms of 
managerial ability. Particularly, the findings of this paper about the roles of ISIS carry potential 
implications for practitioners, regulators, and academics, as “the economics of security is one of 
the most important issues in our discipline, yet, the one least researched” (Chen et al., 2020a). 
Given the obvious increase in terrorist activities in recent years (e.g., Miller, 2016), this paper 
suggests that investors and regulators should be vigilant of the negative impact of terrorist 
activities or geographical proximity to terrorist groups/activities on the accounting choices by 
managers when assessing the costs of terrorism and developing policies. In addition, in response 
to recent calls to study the firm-level consequences of terrorism in different countries (e.g., Chen 
et al., 2020b), this paper would provide beneficial insights on the role of a modern terrorist 
group, ISIS.  
Nevertheless, this paper encourages future research to examine how terrorism may 
influence the association of managerial ability and other important accounting variables (such 
as real accruals management) and also the infrastructure choices (such as internal control 
quality) that have been shown to influence earnings quality. Further, this study does not 
investigate the reasons behind the negative impact of ISIS on earnings quality. This could be 
due to a political connection between Iraqi firms and ISIS which could also be addressed by 
future research. Moreover, the extent to which the results of this study can be extended to 
large capital markets is not clear, which could also be investigated by future studies. Future 
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research may also examine how managerial ability interacts with firm characteristics such as 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, and how this association is affected 
by terrorism.    
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Figure 1: Summary of theoretical arguments for research hypotheses 
   






H2 & H3 
H1 
Opportunistic perspective 
 versus  
Efficient perspective 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Median STD Min Max 
Restate 0.363 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
Persist 0.152 0.159 0.151 -0.219 0.708 
AQ -0.069 -0.074 -0.282 -0.312 0.000 
ERC 0.014 0.018 0.430 -0.013 0.338 
M.Ability -0.001 0.023 0.354 -0.574 0.526 
ISIS 0.571 1.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
ISIS proximity 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Firm Size 9.615 9.708 0.516 8.306 11.124 
Sales Volatility 0.103 0.074 0.120 0.008 0.685 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.336 0.081 1.145 0.005 1.076 
Operating Cycle 109.987 107.34 58.097 22.764 296.897 
Big Auditor 0.073 0.000 0.261 0.000 1.000 
Loss 0.408 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Sales Growth 0.238 0.021 0.875 -0.795 19.795 
Return on Assets 0.014 0.056 0.157 -0.267 0.413 



















  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  0.974**  0.401  -0.298*  0.194  0.783***  0.297  0.059  0.067 
M.Ability  -0.172**  0.086  -0.639***  0.165  0.189***  0.068  0.047**  0.023 
Earnings      0.038**  0.018      0.027**  0.014 
Earnings×M.Ability      0.021**  0.011      0.014**  0.006 
Firm Size  -0.056  0.047  0.037*  0.021  -0.040**  0.016  -0.011  0.010 
Sales Volatility  -0.010  0.526  -0.069  0.163  -0.067*  0.083  0.018  0.016 
Cash Flow Volatility  0.009**  0.004  0.009  0.008  -0.014  0.016  -0.005**  0.002 
Operating Cycle  0.004  0.006  0.005  0.013  0.006**  0.003  -0.018  0.015 
Big Auditor  -0.038  0.242  -0.072*  0.043  0.011  0.028  -0.015**  0.007 
Loss  -0.541***  0.136  0.041  0.029  -0.038  0.033  0.029***  0.009 
Sales Growth  0.002  0.007  -0.016**  0.007  0.009  0.034  0.008**  0.004 
Return on Assets  0.349**  0.162  0.068  0.104  0.195**  0.086  0.208***  0.069 
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.461    0.514    0.373    0.795   
F (p-value)  16.534 (0.000)  17.365 (0.000)  7.374 (0.000)  39.633 (0.000) 
Obs.  245       245    245    245   
Notes: This table shows the association between managerial ability and four earnings quality metrics.  *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard 



















  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  0.795***  0.229  0.306*  0.164  0.249**  0.105  0.589***  0.123 
M.Ability  -0.183***  0.063  0.020  0.013  0.285**  0.119  -0.043*  0.024 
Earnings      0.582**  0.235      0.084  0.096 
Earnings×M.Ability      0.093**  0.038      0.075**  0.036 
ISIS 
 0.004***  0.002  -0.032***  0.008  -0.024**  0.011  -0.046***  0.017 
M.Ability×ISIS 
 0.092***  0.025      -0.145**  0.066     
Earnings×M.Ability×ISIS 
     -0.052**  0.022      -0.051*  0.027 
Controls  Included     Included     Included     Included    
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.698    0.598    0.499    0.470   
F (p-value)  14.941 (0.000)  17.359 (0.000)  14.864 (0.000)  12.532 (0.000) 
Obs.  245        245    245    245   
Note: This table shows the impact of ISIS on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality metrics.  *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 









Figure 2: Effect size of ISIS 
 
  
    
                      f2=0.29      f2=0.15      f2=0.19      f2=0.11 
Notes: This figure displays the strength of ISIS moderating effect in the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality metrics. f 2 is the ratio of variance 





























































































  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  0.089  0.055  0.323*  0.166  0.138**  0.060  0.879***  0.372 
M.Ability  -0.267**  0.131  0.046*  0.025  0.506***  0.127  -0.063*  0.035 
Earnings      0.496***  0.188      0.067  0.094 
Earnings×M.Ability      0.079***  0.305      0.556**  0.265 
ISIS proximity 
 0.007**  0.003  -0.009**  0.005  -0.053**  0.023  -0.059***  0.020 
M.Ability×ISISproximity 
 0.151**  0.070      -0.348**  0.162     
Earnings×M.Ability×ISIS proximity 
     -0.072**  0.035      -0.389*  0.231 
Controls  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.406    0.376    0.378    0.390   
F (p-value)  12.130 (0.000)  15.620 (0.000)  13.984 (0.000)  12.242 (0.000) 
Obs.  140        140    140    140   
Notes: This table shows the impact of geographical proximity to ISIS on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality metrics. *, **, *** Significant at 










Table 5: Alternative measure of managerial ability 
 













  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Abilitycomp  -0.033**  0.016  -0.051**  0.024  0.074***  0.020  0.021*  0.012 
Earnings      0.037*  0.019      -0.033*  0.019 




   
Included 
   
Included 
   
Included 
  
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.418    0.462    0.410    0.598   
F (p-value)  13.651 (0.000)  15.653 (0.000)  7.764 (0.000)  33.431 (0.000) 


















  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Abilitycomp  -0.084**  0.036  0.246*  0.131  0.191*  0.114  -0.169*  0.090 
Earnings      0.519***  0.197      0.081  0.084 
Earnings×M.Abilitycomp      0.346**  0.153      0.298**  0.134 
ISIS 
 0.009**  0.003  -0.036***  0.009  -0.032**  0.015  -0.021**  0.009 
M.Abilitycomp×ISIS 
 0.072**  0.035      -0.182*  0.094     
Earnings×M.Abilitycomp×ISIS 
     -0.186**  0.079      -0.282*  0.164 
Controls  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.613    0.516    0.482    0.457   
F (p-value)  14.002 (0.000)  17.783 (0.000)  15.303 (0.000)  12.572 (0.000) 



















  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Abilitycomp  -0.041**  0.020  0.058*  0.031  0.394***  0.161  -0.079*  0.040 
Earnings      0.237**  0.118      0.085  0.201 
Earnings×M.Abilitycomp      0.072**  0.033      0.490**  0.240 
ISIS proximity 
 0.012*  0.006  -0.028***  0.008  -0.039*  0.020  -0.038**  0.016 
M.Abilitycomp×ISIS proximity 
 0.037**  0.020      -0.388**  0.194     
Earnings×M.Abilitycomp×ISIS proximity 
     -0.069***  0.018      -0.485*  0.280 
Controls  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.409    0.561    0.401    0.571   
F (p-value)  11.4654 (0.000)  17.676 (0.000)  14.391 (0.000)  13.598 (0.000) 
Obs.  92         92    92    92   
Notes: This table shows the results of re-examining the research hypotheses using the composite measure of managerial ability.  *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 










Table 6: Propensity score matching  
Panel A: Determination of managerial ability 
  M.Abilitydummy             
  Coef.  SE.             
Constant  0.625***  0.128             
ISIS  -0.052**  -0.025             
Market to book value  0.105  0.082             
Leverage  -0.024*  -0.013             
Cash flow from operations 
 0.017**  0.008             
Return on assets 
 0.038**  0.017             
Annual management bonus  0.048*  0.029             
Percentage of institutional ownership 
 0.053**  0.027             
Board independence  0.019  0.028             
Year fixed effects  Included               
Industry fixed effects  Included               
                 
Pseudo R2  0.307               























  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Ability  -0.196**  0.094  -0.579**  0.245  0.284***  0.079  0.032**  0.014 
Earnings      0.029*  0.015      -0.035*  0.019 
Earnings×M.Ability      0.011*  0.007      0.029**  0.011 
Controls 
 Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.563    0.673    0.397    0.328   
F (p-value)  15.274 (0.000)  17.874 (0.000)  12.099 (0.000)  11.642 (0.000) 
Obs.  164    164    164    164   
Notes: This table shows the impact of ISIS on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality metrics using a PSM analysis. *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 




















  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Ability  -0.072**  0.030  0.026*  0.015  0.298**  0.124  -0.064*  0.033 
Earnings      0.642***  0.174      0.088  0.084 
Earnings×M.Ability      1.056**  0.443      0.562*  0.290 
ISIS 
 0.005**  0.002  -0.033***  0.009  -0.027**  0.013  -0.031**  0.011 
Local 
 0.008***  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.004*  0.002  0.005*  0.003 
M.Ability×ISIS×Local 


















Controls  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.761    0.540    0.433    0.482   
F (p-value)  16.074 (0.000)  17.005 (0.000)  13.864 (0.000)  12.642 (0.000) 
Obs.  176         176    176    176   
Notes: This table shows the impact of ISIS on the association between managerial ability and earnings quality metrics using a difference-in-differences analysis. *, **, *** 







Table 8: How macroeconomic variables affect research results 













  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Ability  -0.173***  0.060  0.027**  0.011  0.259**  0.113  -0.044**  0.022 
Earnings      0.552**  0.230      0.078  0.095 
Earnings×M.Ability      0.089***  0.032      0.069**  0.032 
ISIS 
 0.005**  0.002  -0.027***  0.007  -0.022**  0.010  -0.058***  0.016 
M.Ability×ISIS 
 0.096***  0.024      -0.136**  0.063     
Earnings×M.Ability×ISIS 
     -0.061***  0.021      -0.049**  0.024 
GDP  -0.064*  0.034  0.076***  0.018  0.063***  0.022  0.085***  0.018 
Inflation  -0.023  0.099  0.216**  0.085  -0.199**  0.089  0.159*  0.085 
Exchange  0.034*  0.018  -0.115**  0.048  0.208  0.174  -0.051  0.153 
Unemployment  0.019  0.155  -0.225  0.130  -0.176  0.158  -0.204*  0.118 
Controls  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.681    0.610    0.497    0.489   
F (p-value)  14.781 (0.000)  17.935 (0.000)  14.858 (0.000)  13.017 (0.000) 



















  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE.  Coef.  SE. 
Constant  Included    Included    Included    Included   
M.Ability  -0.251*  0.129  0.044**  0.022  0.484***  0.126  -0.067**  0.031 
Earnings      0.472***  0.181      0.066  0.092 
Earnings×M.Ability      0.061**  0.300      0.561**  0.260 
ISIS proximity 
 0.006**  0.003  -0.011**  0.005  -0.042**  0.021  -0.049***  0.018 
M.Ability×ISIS proximity 
 0.162**  0.067      -0.369**  0.159     
Earnings×M.Ability×ISIS proximity 
     -0.081***  0.031      -0.377*  0.226 
GDP  -0.059*  0.032  0.083***  0.021  0.056***  0.020  0.094***  0.018 
Inflation  -0.015  0.083  0.252***  0.093  -0.195**  0.086  0.180*  0.095 
Exchange  -0.014  0.012  -0.097**  0.042  0.173  0.187  -0.279*  0.161 
Unemployment  0.018  0.173  -0.251*  0.150  -0.192  0.162  -0.256*  0.142 
Controls  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Year fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
Firm fixed effects  Included    Included    Included    Included   
                 
Adjusted R2  0.391    0.401    0.381    0.429   
F (p-value)  12.001 (0.000)  16.751 (0.000)  14.064 (0.000)  13.372 (0.000) 
Obs.  140        140    140    140   
Notes: This table shows the results of re-examining research hypotheses after the inclusion of key macroeconomic variables in empirical models.  *, **, *** Significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
